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In the Categories, Aristotle addresses two different cases of dual cat-
egorization, cases in which the same thing might appear in two different
categories: relatives and secondary substances in the first case, qualities
and relatives in the second. His treatment of these two cases is markedly
different. Ackrill thinks dual categorization poses a dilemma for Aris-
totle’s project as a whole, but I argue that there is a dilemma only on
particular understandings of Aristotle’s purpose in compiling the list of
categories. I investigate various interpretations of the categories to find
one that explains Aristotle’s reactions to dual categorization, and sug-
gest an interpretation of the peculiar four-fold system of classification in
Chapter 2.
Can one thing appear in two separate categories? It seems to me that this
question cannot be answered without determining the purpose for which the
categories are established. If such dual categorization causes no problems ac-
cording to the intended purpose of the categorial scheme, then there seems to be
no reason for complaint. This is the approach that I take with regard to Aris-
totle’s categorial scheme in the Categories. In this work, Aristotle addresses
two separate instances of dual categorization with regard to his list of ten cate-
gories, but his reaction in these cases is surprisingly different, taking great pains
to avoid dual categorization in one case, but showing a marked lack of concern
in the other case. This indifference in the second case leads John Ackrill to
criticize Aristotle’s categorial project in general; however, it seems to me that
if Aristotle’s reaction to dual categorization in one case seems contrary to some
conception of Aristotle’s purpose in developing the categorial scheme, then per-
haps that conception of the purpose of the Categories may not be a conception
that Aristotle himself held.
In this paper I will review the two cases of dual categorization in the Cat-
egories and will examine Aristotle’s reaction in each case. Against these reac-
tions, I will examine several general contemporary interpretations of the purpose
of the Categories within the Aristotelian corpus to show how Aristotle’s reac-
tions occasion such criticisms as Ackrill’s. I next review specific interpretations
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by Abraham Edel and Stephen Menn concerning the purpose of the list of ten
categories in an attempt to avoid such criticisms with regard to dual categoriza-
tion, arguing that Menn’s account better explains Aristotle’s reactions to dual
categorization. Finally, I suggest that the four-fold scheme of classification that
appears in Chapter 2 is a replacement system of categories for the list of ten,
occasioned in part by the problems raised by dual categorization for Aristotle’s
broader projects.
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Aristotle presents two separate definitions of relatives in Chapter 7 of the Cate-
gories. The first comes at the very beginning of the chapter. “We call relatives
all such things as are said to be just what they are, of or than other things, or in
some other way in relation to something else” (6a36).1 The second definition is
prompted by Aristotle’s concern that some secondary substances might qualify
as relatives on this initial definition. The problem is that certain secondary
substances, such as heads and hands, seem to meet the criterion of relatives
in this definition, since “a head is called someone’s head and a hand is called
someone’s hand” (8a26). This would then clearly be a case of dual categoriza-
tion. Consequently, Aristotle offers a second definition that seems both to avoid
this problem and to address the nature of relatives more essentially: “if those
things are relatives for which being is the same as being somehow related to
something, then perhaps some answer may be found” (8a31).
The tentative way in which Aristotle presents this second definition is strik-
ing. He does not assert confidently that this definition will overcome the prob-
lems of the first definition, but seems rather to offer it as a mere suggestion of a
solution. His subsequent discussion of this second definition seems to provide a
good argument for its adequacy, so it seems unusual that Aristotle would present
the definition so cautiously. For that matter, it is curious that Aristotle would
offer an initial definition that he recognizes to be faulty and would discourse on
the nature of relatives for several pages on the basis of that definition before
addressing the inadequacy and offering a better definition. These considerations
give this chapter of the Categories the flavor of a work in progress, rather than
the appearance of a complete, polished theory.
Here in any case, it is clear that Aristotle takes the problem of dual catego-
rization seriously enough to revise a definition to avoid the problem. It is not
clear from this chapter, though, whether it is the problem of dual categorization
itself or the special problems that dual categorization would cause for the notion
of substance that prompts Aristotle’s concern. In other words, is it something
about the category of substance that Aristotle feels requires the avoidance of
dual categorization of things within that category, or is it the problem of dual
categorization in general that Aristotle needs to avoid? Aristotle offers no ex-
plicit explanation to answer this question, but he does address another instance
1 I use Ackrill’s translation in this paper. See Ackrill (1963).
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of possible dual categorization in the following chapter against which his re-
action in this instance may be compared, and his response there is distinctly
different.
Aristotle defines qualities at the beginning of Chapter 8 as follows: “By a
quality I mean that in virtue of which things are said to be qualified somehow”
(8b25). Immediately Aristotle notes that quality has several different senses,
which he proceeds to distinguish. At the end of the chapter, the issue of dual
categorization arises again with regard to the category of relatives. “We should
not be disturbed lest someone may say that though we proposed to discuss qual-
ity we are counting in may relatives (since states and conditions are relatives)”
(11a20). Aristotle in fact has two separate responses to this case of dual cat-
egorization, but his tone in presenting the problem indicates immediately that
this case of dual categorization is not a matter of concern for him.
The first response is to make further distinctions concerning what is offered
as a putative case of dual categorization. “For in pretty well all such cases the
genera are spoken of in relation to something, but none of the particular cases
is” (11a23). The genera may indeed be relatives, but the particulars are qual-
ities. Aristotle offers the example of knowledge, which as a genus seems to be
a relative, since it is knowledge of something, but any specific case of knowl-
edge, such as grammar, is not relative. This sort of response could not have
been adopted in the case of secondary substances and relatives, although since
the particulars of secondary substances are primary substances, such primary
substances do not fall into the first definition of relatives. However, since the
genera of secondary substances are themselves secondary substances, the dis-
tinction between genus and particular does not necessarily solve the problem,
because it is precisely the genera that are problematic in this case.
Note that Aristotle does not assert absolute confidence that all cases of
putative dual categorization can be handled in this way, only that “pretty well
all such cases” are open to such a solution. Consequently, Aristotle offers a
second response, which is strikingly blatant in its indifference. “Moreover, if
the same thing really is a qualification and a relative there is nothing absurd
in its being counted in both the genera” (11a37). Unfortunately, Aristotle does
not explain the grounds for this lack of absurdity. Here it does not seem to be
ambiguity in categorization that prompts Aristotle’s indifference, since such an
ambiguity would be capable of disambiguation as Aristotle had attempted in
his first response to this case of dual categorization. If such were the case, there
would not seem to be any need for a second response, since some distinction
would serve to disambiguate the apparent dual categorization. Rather, in this
response Aristotle considers the circumstance of the same thing really belonging
in two different categories, not of it merely appearing that way.
Here again, it is not clear from Aristotle’s reaction whether it is the peculiar
nature of qualities and relatives that makes such dual categorizations permis-
sible, or whether the problem of dual categorization itself is not a concern of
Aristotle’s at all. However, coupled with his response to the case of dual cat-
egorization with regard to relatives and secondary substances, it seems that if
Aristotle is going to be consistent in his approach to these two cases, then ei-
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ther (1) dual categorization in general is not a problem, but it causes specific
problems for secondary substances, or (2) dual categorization in general is a
problem, but the specific nature of qualities and relatives permit a loophole
to escape the problem. The second option seems suggested by Aristotle’s first
response to the dual categorization of qualities and relatives, since as noted,
the distinction between genera and particular was not an available option to
solve the dual categorization of relatives and secondary substances. Yet the
first option here might be supported by the consideration of the role that the
category of substance plays within the investigations into being qua being in
the Metaphysics. Even if other categories may permit dual categorization, for
substance to do so in any way would seem to compromise the foundations of
being, particularly if the dual categorization with regard to substance were to
involve relatives. Again, it is not absolutely clear to me how to understand
Aristotle’s reactions in these two cases of dual categorization solely on the basis
of the textual evidence. As suggested at the beginning of this paper, it seems
to me that this question cannot be addressed without considering the purpose
for which Aristotle created the list of categories.
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Robin Smith summarizes three common interpretations of the list of categories:
(1) “types of predicates, that is, types of expression that can be predicated
of something else” (p. 55), (2) “highest genera” (p. 55), and (3) “types of
predication: each category gives one possible relationship between predicate
and subject” (p. 56). Depending upon which of these interpretations one may
adopt, or indeed some alternative interpretation, Aristotle’s reaction to the two
cases of dual categorization may appear in a different light.
John Ackrill, for example, says of the dual categorization of qualities and
relatives, “there is a nasty dilemma, and its existence points to a weakness
in the foundations of Aristotle’s theory of categories” (p. 109). In develop-
ing an interpretation of the Categories, Ackrill considers two possible methods
for generating categories, evidence for both he finds in the Topics (Ackrill, p.
79–80). The first method corresponds to the first interpretation that Smith sum-
marizes, namely classifying “predicate expressions”, whereas the second method
ultimately corresponds to the second of Smith’s interpretations, generating high-
est genera by a consideration of “subject-expressions” (p. 79). That the two
methods seem to result in the same list is explained by Ackrill as follows: “The
assumption that a given question determines a range of answers that does not
overlap with any range determined by a different question corresponds to the
assumption that no item when defined per genus et differentiam will be found
to fall under more than one highest genus” (p. 80). Here Ackrill explicitly
acknowledges that he takes Aristotle to be working under the assumption that
there will be no overlap between the categories, an assumption which seems hard
to reconcile with Aristotle’s equally explicit assertion that there is no absurdity
if something can appear in two genera, at least with regard to qualities and
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relatives (11a37), unless there is something special about qualities and relatives
that makes certain cases of overlap in these two categories excusable.
However, Ackrill does not seem to recognize any such excuses. The specific
dilemma that Ackrill sees with regard to Aristotle’s explanation of the dual
categorization of qualities and relatives relies directly on the putative assump-
tion on Aristotle’s part that there will be no overlap in categories. Recall that
Aristotle’s first response to cases of dual categorization of certain qualities and
relatives depended upon placing the genus in the category of relatives but the
particulars in the category of qualities. Ackrill complains, “The claim that a
genus that is a relative may have species that are not relatives seems to conflict
with Aristotle’s whole idea of a genus-species classification and categorial lad-
ders. So too does the suggestion (11a37) that the same ‘thing’ may be in two
categories” (p. 108). If a project of strict classification into genus and species
arrayed in a strict hierarchy in which the categories appear at the top is indeed
Aristotle’s intention, then there does not seem to be any room for exceptions in
the hierarchies topped by qualities and relatives.
As I suggested at the beginning of this paper, if the interpretation that Ack-
rill adopts leads him to posit a dilemma for Aristotle, then perhaps the first
way to resolve the dilemma is to doubt whether Aristotle himself held the as-
sumptions with which Ackrill credits him. As noted earlier, Ackrill explicitly
saddles Aristotle with a view that there must be no overlap in the categories. It
is not clear from the text, however, that Aristotle himself makes this assump-
tion. When the list of categories is introduced in Chapter 4 of the Categories,
Aristotle does not indicate that these categories are to be considered as highest
genera at all. He merely indicates that these are significations of things that
are “said without any combination” (1b25). Ackrill’s notes two interpretations
of this phrase. The first is “(a) The necessary and sufficient condition for an
expression’s being ‘without combination’ is that it should signify just one item
in some category” (p. 73). This is an interpretation that seems to underwrite
Ackrill’s assumption that Aristotle aimed at a list of non-overlapping highest
genera; however, Ackrill himself immediately criticizes this interpretation based
on the “misleadingly selective” examples in Chapter 2, “since on this criterion a
single word could be an expression involving combination and a group of words
could be an expression without combination” (p. 73). In any case, Ackrill ac-
knowledges a second interpretation that seems preferable, “(b) The distinction
in Chapter 2 is, as it looks, a purely linguistic one between single words and
groups of words (or perhaps sentences)” (p. 73). Consequently, the way in
which Aristotle introduces the list of categories does not definitively indicate
that he is treating them as a list of highest genera.
It is true that this introduction immediately follows statements in Chapter
3 concerning differentiae of genera and species, so the context may indicate
that the list of categories is an enumeration of genera. Yet Ackrill himself
places the first three chapters in a different thematic part than the chapters
that specifically address the ten categories (p. 69). It is not certain that it
was Aristotle himself rather than an ancient editor who placed the first three
chapters in conjunction with the next six such that the presentation of the
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list of categories falls in the context of the discussion of genera and species.
Furthermore, according to Ackrill’s own translation, Chapter 3 addresses “the
differentiae of genera which are different” (1b16). If the ten categories are indeed
viewed as genera by Aristotle, it is not certain that Aristotle is yet prepared to
claim that they are different genera. In the case of the dual categorization of
relatives and secondary substances, Aristotle does take great pains to redefine
relatives so that it does become a different genera than substance, but in the
case of quality and relatives, his denial of the absurdity of placing the same
thing in these two genera may merely be an indication that Aristotle has not
yet decided whether the genera of quality and relatives are really different. This
again would suggest that the Categories is still a work in progress, rather than
a final, polished theory. Ackrill’s criticisms might still hold in that case, if
Aristotle was attempting to distinguish different genera, since Aristotle would
need to resolve Ackrill’s dilemma to complete his categorial theory.
Yet this interpretation still assumes that Aristotle aims at a list of non-
overlapping highest genera, and even if the Categories is a work in progress,
it is still not clear that Aristotle is aiming at such a list of highest genera,
rather than adopting an aim represented by one of the other interpretations
that Smith summarizes. While it is true that Ackrill notes the equivalence of
results between the method of seeking types of predication and the method of
identifying highest genera by classifying subject expressions, this equivalence
is based upon Ackrill’s assumption that the range of answers in the kinds of
predication do not overlap with any other range of answers (p. 80). If Aristotle
is indeed identifying types of predication, it is not clear from the text that he
demands that there be no overlap. Indeed, these predication types may depend
upon different senses of the predicates themselves, and Aristotle notes that
“quality is one of the things spoken of in a number of ways” (8b26). In this way
it does not seem unusual for Aristotle to argue in his first response to the dual
categorization of certain qualities and relatives that what is so categorized must
be distinguished as genus or as particular, such that the genus and particular
would fall into different types of predicates. There is thus overlap only when
this distinction is not made. This suggests a difference in aim that would avoid
Ackrill’s dilemma, which arises only when these types of predicates are taken as
genera within the same series as the genera and particulars of what are falling
within those types. This requirement of a single series of genera seems to follow
if the aim of the categories were to provide a list of highest genera, but if the aim
were to identify types of predicates, it seems that this series of types does not
need to be part of the series of genera of what falls within the types, not in the
sense of predicates as such, but in the sense of being what they are essentially.
The two series of genera would thus be distinguished by the purpose to which
the series are applied. If applied ontologically, then Ackrill’s dilemma seems to
arise; if applied linguistically, then the series remain separate, and Aristotle’s
first response seems plausible. If there is overlap within a purely linguistically
oriented series of types of predicates, this overlap might be explained by further
distinctions within the pragmatics of predication. Depending upon the purpose
for any given act of predication, the predicate itself may fall under one type or
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another.
This response to Ackrill seems even clearer under the third interpretation
summarized by Smith, namely that the list of categories represents types of
predications. The relations between subject and predicate need not fall within
the same ontological hierarchy of genus and species as the things which enter
into such relations, particularly since the categories themselves under this in-
terpretation are understood ontologically as relations. The series of predicative
relations would seem to be addressing a different explanatory need than a se-
ries of genus and species relations understood ontologically. Again, if there is
overlap in these types of predications, that overlap might further be explained
away in terms of the purpose for which the subject was placed in a predicative
relation with the predicate. In this way, Aristotle’s two responses to the dual
categorization of certain qualities and relations seem to avoid Ackrill’s dilemma.
Consequently, it seems that of the three interpretations of the categories that
Smith offers, it is the interpretation of categories as highest genera that is least
able to be reconciled with Aristotle’s reactions to dual categorization, so perhaps
that interpretation should be avoided.
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As I suggested above, either (1) dual categorization in general is not a problem,
but it causes specific problems for secondary substances, or (2) dual categoriza-
tion in general is a problem, but the specific nature of qualities and relatives
permit a loophole to escape the problem. If my current line of argument is
feasible and dual categorization is not a problem in general under one of the
more linguistically oriented interpretations, particularly if two separate series
of genus and species hierarchies are recognized, then it seems that there must
be something special about secondary substances that makes Aristotle wish to
avoid dual categorization in that case. Yet it is not clear to me what this special
problem might be under the two predicative interpretations recently considered.
For if dual categorization in such cases may be explained by distinguishing the
purpose for which the predication was made, it is not clear why secondary sub-
stances as predicate types or predicative relations would cause a special problem
that qualities do not cause. If Aristotle had the kind of approach in mind that I
am suggesting here, then why would he not take advantage of this strategy with
regard to relatives and secondary substances without bothering to reformulate
the definition of relatives to avoid dual categorization? He seems much more
satisfied with his second definition of relatives than with his first, not merely
because it avoids dual categorization, but because the first definition “is not
what their being relatives is” (8a34). As I understand Aristotle here, he prefers
the second definition over the first because the first seems to rely on an inci-
dental feature of relatives, whereas the second seems to capture the nature of
relatives more essentially. Thus it seems to me that Aristotle’s aim in putting
the list of categories is not merely pragmatic or linguistic, as suggested in my
treatment of the two predicative interpretations, but does involve ontological
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considerations, thus seeming to collapse the proposed distinction between two
series of genus and species relations into one, thus resulting in a single series
in which the categories form the highest genera. However, the interpretation of
the categories as highest genera resulted in Ackrill’s dilemma, so it seems that
another interpretation of Aristotle’s aim is needed.
Fortunately other interpretations are available, since the three interpreta-
tions that Smith summarizes are not logically exhaustive. One such interpreta-
tion comes from Abraham Edel, who offers the following interpretation of the
list of categories: “They are concepts that grew out of a variety of problems in a
variety of domains of Aristotelian (and general earlier philosophic and scientific)
inquiry and take on a key role in the formulation of questions and in guiding
the mode of resolution” (pp. 52–3). According to Edel, Aristotle arrives at his
specific list of categories “in a sweeping inductive way” (p. 53). Edel himself
arrives at this conclusion by “track[ing] down more systematically the uses of
the categories in the various parts of the Corpus”, and he suggests that “Aris-
totle’s own theory of the causes (aitia) itself would suggest such an approach”
(p. 49). As fundamental concepts, the list of categories thus seems to make
absurd the question concerning what the single purpose of the categories would
be, since they are fundamental across a number of different inquiries, but rather
seem to suggest a series of questions concerning the role of the categories within
a specific inquiry, such as metaphysics or ethics. Indeed, Edel has traced the
appearance of the list of categories as a whole as well as the development of
specific categories across a variety of Aristotle’s works. I do not feel especially
competent to evaluate Edel’s specific results; rather I intend merely to follow
up on his interpretive suggestion and to investigate how this interpretation may
help address the issue of dual categorization as I have presented it.
In taking the list of categories to be fundamental concepts, Edel’s interpreta-
tion does not automatically preclude any of the three other interpretations that
Smith summarizes when these fundamental concepts are considered within the
context of the logical investigations in the works that form the Organon. It may
happen that one of these interpretations turns out to represent the key role that
the fundamental concepts play within the Organon. Edel himself notes of the
categories as fundamental concepts that “It follows as a secondary matter in the
Aristotelian way of doing things that they will be regarded as the appropriate
classification of terms or as designating the forms of being” (p. 53). However if
such is the case, then Edel’s view does not seem to help with regard to the issue
of dual categorization, since in either of these roles, Ackrill’s dilemma seems to
arise as I have just argued.
Still, Edel’s interpretation may seem to provide some way to understand
these cases of dual categorization, since if his characterization of categories as
concepts is taken seriously, there does not seem to be any reason to suppose
that the application of these concepts in any specific instance must not involve
any overlap of categories, as Ackrill has assumed. Why should any given thing
or notion involve one and only one fundamental concept? Rather anything that
may be investigated will likely involve many of these concepts. However, this
approach to answering the problem of dual categorization does not seem to
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square very well with the text of the Categories. Why would Aristotle even
raise the issue of something falling under more than one category if he recog-
nized that any given notion will involve many concepts, and in particular, why
would he bother to revise the definition of relatives to avoid dual categorization
if he recognized that heads and hands might involve both the concepts of sub-
stance and relatives? Taking categories as concepts may seem to provide a quick
answer to the problem of dual categorization, but the answer seems to require
ignoring the very textual evidence that posed the problem in the first place. Fur-
thermore, this textual evidence seems to pose an additional problem for Edel’s
interpretation itself, since if Aristotle recognizes the problem of dual categoriza-
tion sufficiently well to address the problem twice, then it seems necessary to
credit Aristotle thereby with recognizing a problem with dual conceptualization,
which seems not to be a problem at all under Edel’s interpretation. Because
this sort of blatant confusion on Aristotle’s part seems unlikely, it therefore
seems unlikely to attribute to him an understanding of the categories merely as
concepts. Edel’s interpretation of the categories as fundamental concepts may
indeed represent Aristotle’s thinking about them at an early point in time, by
the time of the writing of the text of the Categories, Aristotle seems to have
begun to think about them differently, as evidenced precisely by his reactions
to cases of dual categorization.
Stephen Menn has argued that the Categories provides a preliminary inves-
tigation for the Topics by providing tests for genera that thereby support the
rules outlined in the Topics (p. 318). If there is confusion between two or more
genera, then certain rules concerning the application of genus and species, or
even concerning predication, will likely be violated. Since Aristotle focuses on
the rules themselves in the Topics, he needs to provide tests to avoid such con-
fusion elsewhere, namely in the Categories. This interpretation seems plausible
to me (though see Leszl, p. 92 for difficulties), and it also seems to provide
some explanation for Aristotle’s differing reactions to the cases of dual catego-
rization, since if what Aristotle provides with his list of categories are tests to
support the rules in the Topics, then the categories do not necessarily need to
form a completely exclusive list of genera, so long as there are additional rules
by which dual categorizations may be managed to avoid certain fallacies. Aris-
totle’s first response to the dual categorization of qualities and relatives seems
to represent such an additional rule, since the distinction between genus and
particular will provide a guide to whether one should place something in one
genus or the other. As noted above, this option was not available in the case
of secondary substances and relatives, so the definition of relatives needed to
be revised. If this response does not cover all cases of dual categorization of
qualities and relatives, then perhaps Aristotle’s second response, that there is
nothing absurd in having something in both of these genera, can be understood
as an explicit claim that these odd cases of dual categorization do not result in
any of the fallacies outlined either in the Topics or in Sophistical Refutations.
Perhaps the confusion of secondary substances and relatives would in fact result
in one or more fallacies, but the confusion of qualities and relatives would not.
Since the main point of the categories is to support the avoidance of fallacies,
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according to Menn’s view, then a difference that makes no difference is not a
cause of concern for Aristotle.
Here at last there seems to be an interpretation of the Categories that may
adequately address the issue of dual categorization. It acknowledges that the
ten categories are indeed understood as genera, which I had questioned earlier,
but allows that this list of genera may indeed be overlapping ones, provided that
these overlaps in the form of dual categorizations do not result in any fallacies.
Yet I noted earlier that in revising the definition of relatives to avoid catego-
rizing secondary substances as relatives, Aristotle seems to display an interest
in the nature of the categories themselves, not merely as pragmatic or linguistic
tools. So again, at the time of the writing of the Categories, Aristotle may
indeed have been considering the list of ten categories in terms of his investiga-
tions in the Topics, but it may be that in the process of writing the Categories
his thinking about them began to change. They begin to point beyond his early
logical investigations toward the considerations of the Metaphysics and, it seems
to me, toward the later logical developments in the Prior Analytics.
Edel argues with regard to his interpretation of the categories as fundamental
concepts of Aristotle, “Such concepts rarely exhaust the full inventory of his
basic ideas; they are usually set in a background of other concepts, but the
spotlight or focus is on them because they are the functioning network in terms
of which proposed answers to philosophic questions are formulated and answers
sought” (p. 59, emphasis in the original). Yet if these fundamental concepts
themselves come into focus against a broader conceptual background, then in
any given consideration of the concepts within a particular inquiry, it seems
possible that one or more of these concepts may come into focus against the
background of the list of categories themselves, as seems to be the case in the
Metaphysics where the category of substance becomes the focus of inquiry into
the nature of being. Further, it seems to me that if one category or concept
may come into focus within a given inquiry, then also relationships between
certain categories may also come into focus. As such, that sort of inquiry might
not explicitly reference one or more categories, as does the Metaphysics, but
the use of those concepts might be merely inherent in the overall discussion.
In effect, those concepts would recede into the background of discussion as the
relationships themselves take focus.
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I suggest that such a situation does occur within part of the Categories. Ackrill
notes that this work is divided into three parts, Chapters 1–3, Chapters 4–9, and
Chapters 10–15 (Ackrill, p. 69). The middle part contains a detailed discussion
of many of the ten categories. This and the third part of the Categories seem
likely to be related to the Topics in the way that Menn suggests. The first
part as well may be seen to have some relevance to the Topics, but its curious
discussion of the four-fold classification of things based upon predication and
inherence seems to go beyond any considerations required in the Topics. “Of
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things there are: (a) some are said of a subject but are not in any subject
. . . (b) Some are in a subject but are not said of any subject . . . (c) Some are
both said of a subject and in a subject . . . (d) Some are neither in a subject
nor said of a subject” (1a20). The relation of this four-fold classification to the
list of ten categories is likewise curious, since Aristotle only explicitly links the
category of substance to one of these four classifications, for primary substance
“is that which is neither said of a subject nor in a subject” (2a12).
From the placement of this four-fold classification before the discussion of
the ten categories, it seems as though this four-fold system is intended to be an
overarching classification into which the ten categories can be placed. If primary
substance is nether predicated of nor inherent in a subject, then likewise it
seems that all the other categories can be classified according to their relations
of predication and inherence with regard to a subject. Indeed this is the way it
may have seemed to whomever ordered the chapters of the Categories as they
appear, but then it is not clear that it was Aristotle himself who arranged the
chapters according to their traditional order.
In any case, I suggest that the four-fold classification scheme is not a more
general framework for classifying the ten categories. After all, Aristotle only
classified primary substance in terms of predication and inherence. If he had
intended the four-fold classification to provide an overarching system of classi-
fication, it seems strange that he did not complete the task and indicate where
the remaining categories fall within the four-fold system. Furthermore, consider
the way that Ackrill understands the four-fold system of classification based
on predication and inherence: “(a) species and genera in the category of sub-
stance; (b) individuals in categories other than substance; (c) species and genera
in categories other than substance; (d) individuals in the category of substance”
(p. 74). For a category to be placed within this four-fold scheme, then either
that category would have to consist entirely of species and genera or entirely
of individuals, or that category would have to be separated into primary and
secondary parts, as Aristotle does with the category of substance. Ackrill asks,
“Why does Aristotle not speak of primary and secondary qualities, &c., as he
does of primary and secondary substances?” (p. 76).
My suggestion in response to this question is that the four-fold classification
is a later development from the articulation and investigation of the ten cate-
gories. It is not an auxiliary scheme for understanding the ten categories. It is in
fact a replacement system of categories. The problems with dual categorization
may indeed have troubled Aristotle as much as they troubled Ackrill. While the
system of ten categories could support his investigations in the Topics, the is-
sues prompted by the instances of dual categorization may have raised problems
for his more ontological concerns. Having already characterized primary sub-
stance in terms of predication and inherence, it may then have seemed natural
for Aristotle to develop the four-fold system of categories based on affirmation
and denial of predication and inherence with regard to a subject, which would
have the advantage over the system of ten categories in that this system was
logically exhaustive and it would not leave openings for dual categorization so
long as the principle of non-contradiction held.
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Furthermore, it seems to me that a categorial scheme devised in terms of
predication and inherence would then provide support for the development of
the syllogism in Aristotle’s Prior Analytics, since the relation of logical conse-
quence that obtains in the valid syllogistic figures is determined by two factors:
(1) the relation between the terms, and (2) the scope of that relation between
the terms. The latter factor is comprehended under modern quantification the-
ory, and seems to govern which specific syllogistic figures are valid according
to whether the scope of certain terms subsumes or excludes other terms. The
former factor, however, provides the essential grounding for the soundness of
the syllogism in principle, since if there were no relation between the terms sep-
arate from purely quantificational concerns, nothing would follow at all from a
syllogism under any figure. These two relations of predication and inherence
seem sufficient for Aristotle to establish the soundness of the syllogism, primar-
ily because they are relations ultimately dependent upon primary substance
as subjects (2a24–2b6). This dependency relation seems to provide a critical
link between the language in which the syllogism is presented and the ontology
represented in the statements. Once the dependency is established for primary
substances, the extension to secondary substances as subjects seems trivial,
since the difference between primary and secondary substances according to the
four-fold system of categories is that secondary substances can be predicated of
a subject, including subjects that are primary substances for which the depen-
dency is already established. In other words, this four-fold system of categories
seems to provide the essential groundwork for the semantics of Aristotle’s syl-
logism.
So while the list of ten categories presented in the Categories may indeed be
understood according to Menn’s interpretation as being part of a preliminary
investigation to support the rules in the Topics, it seems to me that the Cate-
gories as a whole represents a broader development of fundamental concepts, as
Edel suggested, not only with regard to the earlier style of logic as embodied in
the Topics, but also the later syllogistic style developed in the Prior Analytics.
It seems to me that this later development is supported primarily by the four-
fold system of categories rather than the system of ten categories. Both the
earlier and the later categorial schemes have responses to the problem of dual
categorization. The ten-fold categorial scheme supports dual categorization by
the inclusion of additional rules to prevent fallacies in cases where dual catego-
rization appear, whereas the four-fold categorial scheme based on predication
and inherence prevents dual categorization on purely logical grounds given the
law of non-contradiction.
It would be helpful if there were additional textual evidence to support
my interpretations of the two systems of categories in the Categories. Still,
even without such evidence, I think these speculations tell a nice story, one
that captures the development of Aristotle’s thought from the Topics through
the Categories to the Prior Analytics. Other stories may be told, but the
challenge is to find some different way of understanding Aristotle’s reactions to
the two cases of dual categorization that likewise explains the role of the four-
fold categorial scheme based on predication and inherence within the Categories
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and the Organon as a whole.2
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